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Manufacturing Industry 2 
 3 
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 5 
 Controversial issues prevalent in today’s ready-to-wear apparel industry include the right 6 
of workers to join unions, the proliferation of sweatshops and sweatshop conditions, and design 7 
piracy (Ballinger, 2009; Tan, 2007; “Unions Seek Wal-Mart,” 2008). To establish ethical 8 
practices in the apparel industry, codes of conduct have been created by the U.S. Department of 9 
Labor, the Fair Labor Association, and the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (Kunz & 10 
Garner, 2007). While these codes, which span both domestic and international borders, have 11 
improved the awareness of social responsibility, or the “practices for conducting business in 12 
which [firms] make decisions based on how their actions affect others within the marketplace” 13 
(Littrell & Dickson, 1999, p. 6), unethical business activities continue into the 21st century.  14 
 The idea of forming codes of conduct to establish criteria of ethical practices is not new 15 
to the apparel industry. Indeed, the women’s dress manufacturing industry discussed and debated 16 
codes of fair practices and competition under the New Deal Policies of the National Recovery 17 
Act (NRA) of 1933 to 1935. An understanding of the controversial issues debated during this 18 
time and the ultimate failure of the NRA reveals the complexities of the ready-to-wear apparel 19 
industry and the often conflicting aims of industry interests in creating standard practices. The 20 
purpose of this study was to investigate the apparel industry’s code making process and results 21 
during the NRA. Because little research on this topic has been published in the textiles and 22 
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 Marcketti, S. B. (2010). Codes of fair competition: The National Recovery Act, 1933-1935, and 
the women’s dress manufacturing industry. Clothing and Textiles Research Journal, 28(3), 189-
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clothing literature, this study provides an important historical case study for better understanding 23 
the more recent industry-wide codes of fair competition.  24 
 To study this topic, the researcher accessed the governmental hearings on the codes 25 
discussed by apparel industry executives during the NRA. The New York Times, Women’s Wear 26 
Daily and the Journal of the Patent Office Society (which discussed the establishment of the 27 
codes) were systematically searched for reference to the codes and the women’s apparel industry. 28 
The databases JSTOR and America History and Life facilitated the researcher’s search for 29 
relevant secondary information. Financial support was received from The Pasold Research Fund. 30 
The National Recovery Act and Industrial Codes of Conduct  31 
 The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was passed by Congress and approved by 32 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt on June 16, 1933. It was the centerpiece of Roosevelt’s first 100 33 
days in office and was a deliberate attempt to restore industrial prosperity by positive 34 
governmental intervention. Title I of the NIRA, known as the National Recovery Act (NRA), 35 
suspended antitrust laws and called for industries to create codes of industrial production in order 36 
to guard against the dangers of competition. Title II of the NIRA called for the creation of a 37 
Federal Emergency Agency for Public Works that would benefit Americans through direct 38 
government expenditure on public works projects (“National Recovery,” 1935; Romasco, 1983).  39 
 The purposes of Title I of the NIRA were plural and related to the immediate national 40 
emergency of the Great Depression: reemployment and industrial recovery (Clark, Davis, 41 
Harrison & Mead, 1937; Taylor, 2008). The Act was touted as “a new deal for demoralized 42 
industry on a new philosophy of governmental cooperation” (Cates, 1934, p. 130). According to 43 
the Brookings Institute study, which investigated the procedures of the NRA, Washington 44 
became “the industrial as well as the political capital of the nation” (Dearing, Homan, Lorwin, & 45 
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Lyon, 1934, p. xi). The very heart of the program, as stated by NRA administrator General Hugh 46 
Johnson, was “the concerted action in industry under government supervision looking to a 47 
balanced economy as opposed to the murderous doctrine of savage and wolfish individualism, 48 
looking to dog-eat-dog and devil take the hindmost” (Brand, 1988, p. 99-100).   49 
 The NRA called on industries to form trade associations and negotiate and submit for 50 
government approval so-called “codes of fair practices and competition” (Galambos, 1966). 51 
Forty-three industrial groups including, but not limited to, automobile manufacturing, the lumber 52 
industry, the motion picture industry, the wholesale automotive trade, and the dress 53 
manufacturing industry participated in forming codes of conduct under the auspices of the NRA 54 
(“Codes to be Heard,” 1933; Fenning, 1934).2 Industries as specialized as “pickle packers and 55 
powder makers” and manufacturers of everything “from anti-hog cholera serum to wood cased 56 
lead pencils” discussed and applied for the approval of their codes (Wilson, 1962, p. 96). 57 
 Industry members were instructed to work together to form consensus regarding 58 
controversial practices in the best interests of industry, labor, and consumers. The codes were 59 
expected to restrict harmful competition, raise wages and reduce hours, encourage the united 60 
action of labor and management, and eliminate “piratical methods and practices which harassed 61 
honest business and contributed to the ills of labor” (Dearing et al., 1934, p.1; Hapke, 2004). 62 
Objectives for the codes related to the goals suggested by the International Ladies’ Garment 63 
Workers’ Union (ILGWU) to help stabilize the industry (Tyler, 1995). The voluntary codes were 64 
discussed openly by spokespeople in each industry and, once approved, would be administered 65 
by the individual industries with minimal governmental control (Hearing on the Code of Fair 66 
Practices and Competition, 1933). According to General Hugh Johnson, “[The] whole thing 67 
                                                 
2
 Other textiles related groups that considered codes included corset and brassieres, men’s wear, millinery, and 
retailers, among others. A single code for all of the apparel industry was proposed, but rejected. The cotton textile 
code was the first code approved by President Roosevelt on 9 July 1933.  
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simmered down to keeping the purchasing power of workers in step with the price and quantity 68 
of the things they make. Wages, prices, and production, these are the three causes of good or bad 69 
times” (“Johnson says Recovery,” 1933, p.1). 70 
 Government representatives stated that the initiative in preparing codes of fair conduct 71 
would be undertaken by the trade associations of each industry. It was mandated that these 72 
organizations would not create codes designed to promote monopolies or to eliminate or 73 
“oppress” small enterprises, but the creation of the codes themselves were left to the discretion of 74 
the industrial groups (“Dress Code Called,” 1933). Enforcement of the rules was assigned to 75 
each individual industry’s code authorities, supported by the Federal Trade Commission and the 76 
federal courts. Violations of provisions of the codes were to be treated as “unfair methods of 77 
competition” and violators faced misdemeanor charges and a $500 penalty for each offense each 78 
day the violation occurred (Fenning, 1934; “Five hundred in City,” 1933). President Roosevelt 79 
was granted an open ended authority to abolish the codes at any time (Connery, 1938).  80 
 Beyond the elaborate code-making procedures within each industry, the NRA authorized 81 
the president to formulate a Re-Employment Agreement or “blanket code” with individual 82 
businesses. This simplified procedure avoided the time-consuming process of negotiation 83 
required for the codes for an entire industry. Individual employers pledged to abide by certain 84 
specified conditions, namely maximum hour and minimum wage provisions (a minimum wage 85 
of $12 to $13 a week for forty hours of work), a guarantee of the workers’ rights to organize and 86 
to join unions of their own choice, and the elimination of child labor (“Reemployment Drive,” 87 
1933; “Roosevelt gets Cloak,” 1933). Further, the president implored the nation’s managers to 88 
raise wages without increasing prices, “even at the expense of full initial profits” (Jacobs, 1999, 89 
p. 35). Employees who signed the blanket agreement were entitled to display the Blue Eagle 90 
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insignia of the NRA with the words, “Member N.R.A., We Do Our Part” (Figure 1). Consumers 91 
were urged by the government and by industry to patronize retailers that displayed the 92 
government-issued label, symbolizing goods produced in humane working conditions (McKellar, 93 
2002; “Miss Perkins Sews,” 1934). 94 
“Insert Figure 1 About Here” 95 
 Theoretical underpinnings of the NRA were that increased employment and hourly wages 96 
would expand the purchasing power of wage earners. Larger payrolls in turn would circulate 97 
through the entire economic system, benefiting retailers, wholesalers, manufacturers, and 98 
producers, inducing each to take on more workers. Secondly, the positive economic effects of 99 
restricting unfair trade practices would lessen risk and encourage expanded business operations. 100 
Business reform would encourage national economic recovery (Dearing et al., 1934).  101 
 In reality, many industries raised prices in anticipation of the increased operating costs of 102 
conducting business under the NRA (Johnson, 1935). The Brookings Institute found that the 103 
positive incentives for business cooperation were relief from anti-trust laws, authoritative 104 
enforcement of price control measures, and release from competitive practices. In essence, the 105 
central motivating force for businesses’ willingness to cooperate with the codes was the hope of 106 
raising prices by collective action among competitors through control of the market (Lyon, 107 
Howman, Lorwin, Terborgh, Dearing, & Marshall, 1935).  108 
Administration of a Code 109 
 The first steps in the negotiation of a code were under-taken at pre-hearing conferences 110 
between a committee and the deputy NRA administrator recruited from the industries which 111 
were to be regulated. These pre-hearing conferences provided the first opportunity of the 112 
negotiators to flesh out the different conflicts of interest. The pre-hearing conferences were 113 
Clothing and Textiles Research Journal 
Marcketti 
 
informal and not recorded. The public hearings were formally conducted, usually by the Deputy 114 
Administrator and were publicized through the press, trade and industrial journals, and the 115 
posting of bulletins in post offices throughout the country. Nearly all of the hearings were held in 116 
Washington and complete stenographic records were available to the public (Clark et al., 1937).  117 
 During the first six months of the NRA, negotiated and approved codes of fair 118 
competition encompassed the major portions of American industry and trade. By the end of three 119 
years, 578 code authorities were developed, 567 codes were approved and 201 supplementary 120 
codes covering some 22 million workers in 3 million businesses were established (“Questions 121 
and Answers,” 1935). In addition there were 2.3 million blanket codes involving another 16 122 
million workers. From beginning to end, the code making process and the resulting code 123 
authorities which were to administer and enforce the codes were dominated by trade 124 
associations, aided by the government’s deputy administrators.  125 
 Code making was not a simple process, and most of the conflicts which punctuated the 126 
method occurred among competing businesses within the same industries. These disputes were 127 
resolved through a bargaining procedure that put a premium on competitor size and strength. 128 
Other problems resulting from institution of the codes were the nearly 5000 petitions for 129 
exemptions which companies requested from the NRA and challenges with interpretation of the 130 
code provisions. Further, violations of the codes granted some firms advantages over rivals who 131 
continued to bear the financial burdens associated with adherence to the provisions. Efforts to 132 
enforce the codes were inherently self-defeating as these altered the program from one of 133 
voluntary cooperation to one of forced adherence (Clark et al., 1937). 134 
The Dress Manufacturing Industry during the Great Depression  135 
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The Great Depression had tremendous impact upon consumption practices and the 136 
operations of the dress manufacturing industry. Although as much as 25% of the American 137 
workforce was unemployed during periods of the Depression, people continued to consume 138 
goods (Farrell-Beck & Parsons, 2007). Shopping habits changed as women of all income levels 139 
needed to maximize their clothing purchases. They achieved this through comparative shopping, 140 
evaluating similar clothing styles sold by different stores and purchasing based on price in order 141 
to get the most for their money (Barber & Lobel, 1952).  142 
The increased specialization of garments available from the lowest dollar amounts to 143 
several thousand dollars meant women could shop in departments that fit their economic means 144 
and social status (Leach, 1993). Generally speaking, consumers chose to buy less-expensive 145 
clothing rather than cease buying altogether. As stated by Richards (1951), “Women accustomed 146 
to paying $16.95 for their dresses shopped around for one at $10.95, while the $10.95 customer 147 
settled for a $6.95 number” (p. 25). While the number of dresses produced by the manufacturing 148 
industry remained the same, the cost and quality of these dresses decreased significantly 149 
(Kolchin, 1933). According to published records of the U.S. Census of Manufacturers, the 150 
average wholesale value per dress decreased from $5.39 in 1927 to $5.11 in 1929 to $3.74 in 151 
1931 to $2.60 in 1933 to $2.95 in 1935 and to $2.62 in 1937 (Drake & Glaser, 1942). 152 
 The 50% reduction in ten years from dresses wholesaling at $5.39 to $2.62 caused a 153 
fundamental shift in the competitive relationship of the industry. The demand for inexpensive 154 
dresses was strong, stimulating manufacturers to produce increasingly lower-cost creations. 155 
According to a report of the ILGWU, this had a demoralizing influence upon the entirety of the 156 
garment business, “The crisis...has practically revolutionized the main lines of dress merchandise 157 
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to meet a growing demand for cheaper garments…The production slogan in the New York dress 158 
industry has now become not quality but cheapness” (“Dress Trade’s Growth,” 1932). 159 
 One of the ways in which manufacturers achieved lower prices was through the 160 
contracting system. This method of production proliferated during the 1930s due to the 161 
efficiencies of smaller economies of scale. Contractors were more able than large companies to 162 
respond quickly to fashion and price changes. As opposed to inside shops in which dresses were 163 
manufactured from fabric to sewn-garments in one factory location, contractors or sub-164 
manufacturers created clothing out of materials consigned to them by the manufacturer. The 165 
manufacturers often supplied designs, piece goods, materials, and credit. The contractors rented 166 
factory space and machinery, found and hired a labor force, and directed the production process. 167 
The garments were then distributed by jobbers to the retailers (Meiklejohn, 1938). Because 168 
fluctuations in fashion were so great and occurred so quickly, many manufacturers and retailers 169 
were reluctant to assume the risk of purchasing materials and stock long in advance of actual 170 
production or the start of a season. Due to this, on average, the manufacturing workshops, as 171 
distinct from the designing rooms, were busy only 30 to 32 full weeks of the year (Larson, 1963). 172 
 To achieve the lowest costs possible and receive agreements for work, contractors bid 173 
minimal amounts, competing solely on the basis of labor costs. Manufacturers paid contractors 174 
by the piece. Contractors deducted dollar amounts for employees’ use of sewing machines, 175 
needles, and threads from workers’ pay. In the period 1929 to 1933, the average per capita 176 
weekly earnings in all of the manufacturing industry ranged from $17 to $27 (Wolman, 1935). In 177 
the apparel industry, many unskilled employees worked 60 to 70 hours a week for $1 to $3 178 
(Richards, 1951). In addition to long hours and low wages, workers often contended with unsafe 179 
and unsanitary conditions (Richards, 1951). David Dabinsky, labor leader and ILGWU 180 
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President, stated the contracting system was “a chain of exploitation” in which contractors 181 
“hack[ed] away at the wages and conditions of the workers” (Dubinsky & Raskin, 1977, p. 123). 182 
Dubinsky described the shift from inside shops to outside shops “from just being miserable to 183 
being in hell” (Dubinksy & Raskin, 1977, p. 122). Labor supporters maintained the system was 184 
“sick” and “parasitic” and that “employees paid the bill for the chaos of the industry” (Hearing 185 
on the Code, 1933, p. 83).  186 
 Due to the nature of the apparel industry, manufacturers often used multiple sub-187 
manufacturers to create one style of dress. Some of the larger manufacturers required the 188 
services of 25 to 30 contractors to maintain production levels (Richards, 1951). Manufacturers 189 
often used multiple contractors to eliminate the possibility of total, sudden work stoppages. 190 
Strikes within the industry were commonplace even during the Depression (“Seventy Strikers,” 191 
1933; “Sixty Thousand Quit,” 1933; “Garment Workers,” 1933; “General Johnson Ends,” 1934).  192 
 Explaining the necessity of the strikes, Grover Whalen, chairman of the New York City 193 
NRA and “honorary member” of the apparel profession, stated, “….the periods of recovery from 194 
depressions have always brought with them struggles between capital and labor, with labor 195 
seeking by strikes to regain ground in wages, hours, and working conditions lost during the 196 
period of depression” (“Whalen Reports,” 1933, p. 26). Strikes were used during the 1930s by 197 
labor supporters to “uplift the unbelievably low sweatshop standards” in the industry (“Strikes 198 
are Voted,” 1933, p. 8). According to Dubinsky, the strikes helped in “civilizing our industry” 199 
and ensured greater respect for labor (Barbash, 1968, p.102; Parmet, 2005).  200 
 In the 1930s, the dress industry was highly concentrated in and around New York City, 201 
with about 73% of the dress manufacturing establishments in New York employing over 50% of 202 
workers and producing 76% of the total value of goods produced (Drake & Glaser, 1942). The 203 
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predominance of New York as a leading style center was largely due to the adequate supply of 204 
skilled and unskilled labor, transportation facilities, and the proximity to fabric markets. 205 
According to some reports, contractors produced 80 to 85% of all dresses manufactured in the 206 
New York area (“Howard,” 1933; Trowbridge, 1936).  207 
 Partly due to the contracting system, coupled with the cutthroat nature and seasonality of 208 
the business, the apparel industry was besieged with bankruptcies. Studies undertaken by the 209 
New York Dress Joint Board of the Dress and Waist Makers Union revealed that 83% of 210 
businesses formed in 1925 were discontinued by 1933. Further, while customarily about 20% of 211 
apparel firms went out of business annually, this percentage doubled in 1932 (Richards, 1951; 212 
Tepere, 1937). Workers themselves had little security, as employer bankruptcies disrupted 213 
employment (Dubinsky & Raskin, 1977). In describing the dress industry in 1933, C. Robbins, a 214 
dress manufacturer stated, “The dress industry is troubled by an utter absence of security or ease 215 
of mind. Every man in it has had a justifiable fear….as to what dire developments the next 216 
month or week or day might bring forth” (“Plan Organization,” 1933, p. 35). 217 
Formulation of the Dress Manufacturing Industry Code of Conduct  218 
 It was within these conditions that the women’s dress manufacturing industry discussed 219 
and debated codes of fair practice and competition, negotiating specific terms acceptable to the 220 
diverse business groups. The initial code hearings focused on the overall structure of the 221 
industry, namely the relationship between manufacturers and contractors. Specific problems such 222 
as design piracy were discussed at the hearings, but industry members failed to reach consensus 223 
to include these provisions into the code submitted to the president (Hearing on the Code, 1933). 224 
 As defined in the NRA dress manufacturing code, the dress industry included the sale of 225 
women’s, misses’, and junior’s dresses and dressmaker ensembles, with the exclusion of cotton 226 
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house dresses (Gill, 1935).3 The concentration of the major branches of the apparel industry in 227 
the New York metropolitan area gave this region preponderant majority on the code. 228 
Negotiations on the provisions to be contained in the dress code were commenced immediately 229 
following the passage of the NIRA. The first public hearing was held August 23, 1933 with 230 
subsequent amendment hearings in March, October, November and December 1934 and 231 
February 1935 (Trowbridge, 1936). 232 
 Earl Dean Howard, Professor of Economics at Northwestern University was selected by 233 
NRA Administrator General Johnson to bring together the diverse groups of the wearing apparel 234 
industry to discuss the codes under the NRA (“Johnson Aide Asks,” 1933). In an address to the 235 
Association of Dress Manufacturers, Professor Howard stressed the necessity of creating 236 
straightforward codes “to quickly beat this depression” (“To Seek Clothing,” 1933, p. 37). 237 
Members of the steering committee to frame the code for the women’s wear group included 238 
Howard, General Johnson, David Dubinsky - the Labor Advisory Board representative, a 239 
representative of the Industrial Advisory Board, and representatives from the Consumer 240 
Advisory Board and Legal Division of the NRA (Hearing on the Code, 1933).4 Presenters at the 241 
hearings included presidents, chairmen, and representatives from small, medium, and large firms 242 
from around the nation, most notably, representatives from the National Dress Manufacturers’ 243 
Association (NDMA), Industrial Council of Cloak, Suit, and Skirt Manufacturers, and Fashion 244 
Originators’ Guild of America (FOGA) (Call, 1933; “Garment Leaders Draft,” 1933). 245 
 Because the codes were to be instituted by trade groups of each industry, the NDMA was 246 
created to form a single, representative organization “to foster the stability of the industry and to 247 
                                                 
3
 Cotton house dress manufacturers successfully fought to have their own code. This was largely because of the 
cotton house dress manufacturers’ reliance on less fashion-forward garments (“Fight Dress Code,” 1935). 
4
 The apparel industry was unique in having members of both labor and consumer groups-less than 10% of code 
authorities included labor members and less than 2% incorporated consumer representatives (Hawley, 1966). 
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give to this trade an authoritative voice in the formulation and operation of economic 248 
reconstruction” (“For Organization,” 1933, p. 26). The group was comprised of 650 249 
manufacturers and wholesalers, responsible for more than 80 percent of the dress output of the 250 
New York market (“The National,” 1935). The NDMA emerged as the chief proponent of the 251 
trade practice provisions (Call, 1933). Despite the large number of companies represented by the 252 
national group, members of the Popular Price Dress Manufacturers Association argued that they, 253 
the lower-end manufacturers, were not adequately represented (“Popular Price,” 1935).  254 
 Some within the apparel industry stressed the importance of the codes, stating that the 255 
partnership with government “would act as ladders on which crippled business could climb out 256 
of the bag which it is holding” (“Says NRA Realized,” 1934, p. 8). Sylvan Gotshal, counsel to 257 
the NDMA, stated the NRA was a revolution and “a power of peace, which is going to mean 258 
prosperity for this industry for many years to come” (Hearing on the Code, 1933, p. 20). Percy 259 
Straus, President of R. H. Macy & Co., Inc stressed the momentous importance of the NRA in an 260 
address to the National Retail Dry Goods Association (NRDGA).  261 
  [On the] uncharted sea in which we are now sailing, we must steer between the rocks of 262 
 inflation, the shoals of higher prices, and the breakers of unsettled foreign exchange. All 263 
 must quickly realize the implications of the NRA and its possibilities for overcoming 264 
 most of the difficulties that stand in the way of the return of prosperity…There is urgent 265 
 need for whole-hearted cooperation by large and small businesses if industrial recovery is 266 
 to be achieved. We are at war against depression. There is no place for slacker industry 267 
 (“Text of Percy,” 1933, p. 8). 268 
In discussing the necessity of the New Deal policies’ attempts to “make capitalism work in terms 269 
of industrial democracy,” Dubinsky stated, “nobody but a lunatic could believe in a system-or 270 
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rather a lack of system-that produces violent business cycles, mass unemployment and misery for 271 
millions of people” (Stolberg, 1944, p. 198).  272 
 273 
 274 
Results of the Code Making Process  275 
 The agreed-upon code, variously called a “treaty of peace” and a “document of fair play,” 276 
was based on a previous agreement between the NDMA, the ILGWU, and the Joint Board of 277 
Dress and Waist Makers Unions of Greater New York (“Dress Code Put Forward,” 1933). It was 278 
to provide an opportunity to “control” and eliminate “some of the most destructive aspects of 279 
competition” in the apparel industry (Dubinsky & Raskin, 1977, p. 125). By putting into place 280 
rules and restrictions, enforceable by the federal government, the playing field would be leveled 281 
for manufacturers. It was argued that with trade practices standardized, competition could be 282 
predicated upon knowledge, skill, and experiences, rather than cheapness of production (Lasher, 283 
1933). This standardization would reinvigorate employment and strengthen the impaired 284 
purchasing power of the public (Barbash, 1968). 285 
 While agreements between employers and union organizations were formulated before 286 
the NRA, the dress industry code became the force of law when it was authorized and made 287 
effective by President Roosevelt on November 13, 1933 (Dubinsky, 1933). In an industry with a 288 
myriad of differences, ambitions, and personalities, the code was a compromise resulting in one 289 
basic and generic law (Lasher, 1933).  290 
 The code provided provisions for the length of the work week and wage scale for 291 
employees, the registration of contractors by manufacturers, and other labor and trade practices. 292 
It divided the major production centers into the five boroughs of New York City; the Eastern 293 
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Metropolitan area encompassing Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore; the Eastern area including 294 
the New England States, New York State, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland; 295 
and the Western area including all regions not previously mentioned. The regions maintained 296 
specified wage scales; all outside of the New York City area were paid not less than 85 to 90% 297 
of the minimum wages established in the City.5 Employees were to receive the minimum 298 
compensation regardless of time or piece rate (“Text of Code,” 1933). Those employees 299 
manufacturing garments could not work more than 35 hours in any five-day work week. Other 300 
employees, including salesman and designers, could not work more than 40-hour weeks; an 301 
exception of six weeks in any one season was granted, provided that the employer paid an 302 
overtime rate of one and a half times the normal wage (“Text of Code,” 1933).  303 
 Manufacturers were ordered to pay contractors such a rate so that they could pay their 304 
employees the wages and earnings provided in the code’s wage scale and cover their own 305 
overhead expenses. Contractors were no longer able to undersell fellow sub-manufacturers by 306 
lowering labor costs. Manufacturers were also to designate and register with the NRA the 307 
number of contractors that they would use to meet their business requirements (“Text of Code,” 308 
1933). This was to avoid the cut-throat competition stimulated by manufacturers forcing 309 
contractors into bidding wars at the expense of labor (Zahn, 1933).  310 
 The code provided for other labor and trade standards. No person under the age of 16 311 
could be employed in the dress manufacturing industry. Employees had the right to organize and 312 
bargain collectively, free from the interference or coercion of their employers. No work was to 313 
be carried out in tenement homes, basements, or unsanitary or unsafe buildings. Trade practices 314 
included provisions for the returning of merchandise and selling practices. Manufacturers were 315 
                                                 
5
 The minimum wage scale for a full week’s work: cutters $45, sample-makers $30, drapers $27, examiners $21, and 
cleaners and pinkers $15. Un-skilled workers were to be paid a minimum of $14 a week (“Text of Code,” 1933). 
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called upon to sell under uniform terms including standard 8% end of month discounts. This 316 
stipulation forbade secret rebates, refunds, and allowances to retailers. Further, only defective or 317 
delayed merchandise could be returned to manufacturers, preventing retailers from returning 318 
garments that were no longer saleable due to shifting consumer demands. To indicate to 319 
consumers that garments were created according to the requirements of the code, garments were 320 
to bear the NRA Blue Eagle insignia and label (“Text of Code,” 1933). Provisions such as the 321 
abolition of all forms of discrimination and “jim-crowism” (or the systematic practice of 322 
discrimination and segregation of African Americans) were discussed, but not included in the 323 
final code presented to and approved by the president (Hearing on the Code, 1933, p. 367). 324 
 To administer and enforce the provisions of the code, the Dress Code Authority was 325 
created. It was comprised of sixteen individuals with representatives from the NDMA, the 326 
United Association of Dress Manufacturers, Inc., the ILGWU, and members from the eastern 327 
metropolitan area and the western region. Financing for the operation of the code was 328 
apportioned to the apparel industry and paid for by NRA label fees purchased by companies. The 329 
price of the labels ranged from $8.00 per thousand for the city of New York to $10.00 per 330 
thousand beyond city boundaries; the higher price outside of the city defrayed additional 331 
administrative costs (Hearing on the dress manufacturing industry: Amendment Proposal, 1934).   332 
 As published in Women’s Wear Daily, many individuals stated pleasure with the passage 333 
of the NRA code. It was believed that with unfair competition curbed, manufacturers would have 334 
more time to concentrate on the development of the aesthetic elements and the promotion of their 335 
products, rather than cost-cutting measures (Rentner, 1933; “Zahn Predicts,” 1933). Companies 336 
that had been paying living wages to workers and maintaining high conditions in their factories 337 
would no longer be penalized by cut-throat competition (“Leveling,” 1933). According to 338 
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Dubinsky, the minimum wage, “would not only check the merciless competition” of the 339 
sweatshop employer but also “protect the better paid, organized worker from the demoralization 340 
of wage-scales emanating from the sub-standard shop” (Parmet, 2005, p. 85). The restriction of 341 
total work week hours was said to give designers, in particular, more leisure time to think; before 342 
the adoption of the code, the apparel industry was so concerned with “speed, speed, speed” and 343 
“chasing money” that it was believed that the forced “downtime” would encourage creative 344 
talent (“Urges Aid,” 1933, p. 2). The NDMA viewed the code as a “declaration of independence 345 
from unfair competition” (Lasher, 1933, p.1).  346 
 After approval, ideas to expand the original code were suggested. While the more 347 
pressing problems of wages and the limitations of hours were decided in the code, other 348 
problems such as design piracy were noticeably absent. In the article, “Big Bad Wolf ‘Style 349 
Piracy’ Has Little to Fear in Apparel Codes,” Crawford, prominent Women’s Wear Daily writer 350 
and editor, wondered, “If the apparel industry wants design protection or just wants to talk about 351 
it…unless regulation, supervision, and penalties are provided, the recovery act will have passed 352 
into history without the slightest benefit to the fundamental development of the apparel 353 
industries” (1933).6 Additional ideas submitted by the Dress Code Authority to the NRA 354 
included the barring of false advertising (Hearing: Modification, 1934). 355 
 Not everyone in the dress industry was pleased with the code. In amendment hearings, 356 
modification proposals, and the popular press, industry members suggested changes to 357 
everything approved in the original code, from the smallest details of end of month discounting 358 
to the larger matter of the geographical divisions of the industry (Hearing: Amendment, 1934). 359 
Maurice Rentner, chairman of the FOGA and a frequent speaker at the hearings, argued that 360 
                                                 
6
 See Marcketti and Parsons (2006) for analysis of the arguments for regulating design piracy during the NRA.  
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work-week restrictions were unfair to fashion “creators” as they could not be bound by hard and 361 
fixed hours of labor. Rentner continued that the restricted work week and limit on overtime 362 
“throttled creative activity and resulted in a disastrous impairment of the orderly functioning of a 363 
quality apparel manufacturing business” (Rentner Urges,” 1933, p.11).  364 
 Some argued that it was incredibly difficult to enforce the work week standards in an 365 
industry that included a large piece work system, in which workers were paid by the garment that 366 
they sewed, rather than their weekly schedules. The wage scale also forced some manufacturers 367 
to increase their prices, therefore providing advantage to larger companies that were able to 368 
absorb higher production costs (“Leveling,” 1933). Strikes based on misunderstandings and 369 
misuses of the recovery act were commonplace and caused great antagonism between employers, 370 
workers, and labor unions (“Four Thousand,” 1935; “Garment Industry,” 1935; “Peace Parleys,” 371 
1934). Ultimately, the only changes to the original code approved by President Roosevelt were 372 
the allowance of the Code Authority to incorporate in any state of the United States and the 373 
prohibition of bribery to gain trade secrets (Amendment to code of fair competition, 1934). 374 
 Besides specific problems with code rules, the simple act of enforcement was nearly 375 
impossible in an industry as large and diverse as the women’s ready-to-wear manufacturing 376 
business. The codes were intended to be regulated by the industries in which they were 377 
developed, yet enforcement was lax and violations flagrant (“Industry Must Regulate Self,” 378 
1933). Byres Gitchell, chairman of the Dress Code Authority, cited the lack of adequate 379 
recordkeeping by individual dress manufacturers as a handicap in the enforcement of the 380 
standards (“Says Lack of Records,” 1935). The lack of uniformity among codes in all textiles 381 
and apparel organizations caused further damage to success in the women’s dress industry. For 382 
instance, the cotton garment trade codes, among others, overlapped but did not uniformly 383 
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conform to the dress code. This negatively impacted on the number and volume of dresses 384 
created and the possible number of workers employed (“Greater Code Flexibility,” 1935).  385 
 386 
 387 
The End of the N.I.R.A. and the Codes 388 
 On May 26, 1935, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Schecter Poultry V. U.S. that 389 
the NIRA was unconstitutional; Congress had overstepped its constitutional authority by 390 
improperly delegating power to the President to approve codes of conduct and give them the 391 
force of law. Further, the Federal Government had no power to regulate hours and wages in 392 
transactions affecting interstate commerce (“Code-making Authority,” 1935; “Justices Cardozo,” 393 
1935; “NRA Remnants,” 1935). The experiment in fostering economic recovery through 394 
industrial self-government was decisively ended. Roosevelt claimed the NRA was economically 395 
and socially successful in that it employed four million workers, added about $3,000,000,000 to 396 
the annual purchasing power of working people, eliminated child labor and sweatshops, and 397 
inaugurated a “pattern of a new order of industrial regulations” (The New York Times, 1935, p. 398 
2). The Brookings Institute took issue with Roosevelt’s claims and estimated that only 500,000 399 
were added to the employed work force (Dearing, et al., 1934). They argued that increased 400 
employment was achieved primarily because employed workers reduced their hours and received 401 
less pay in order to provide work for the unemployed.  402 
 Immediately following the court’s decision, those within the apparel industry discussed 403 
finding a way to make the codes constitutional or to continue self-regulation in the spirit of the 404 
codes but without government supervision (“First of Bills,” 1935; Fraser, 1991; “NRA begins,” 405 
1935; “Richberg would extend,” 1935; “Voluntary NRA,” 1935). The NRDGA, the NDMA, the 406 
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ILGWU, and various medium to large size individual companies stated in Women’s Wear Daily 407 
and The New York Times that they would continue to conduct business under the fair trade 408 
provisions of the code (figure 2) (“Business to Fight,” 1935; Call, 1935a; “Dress Association 409 
Move,” 1935; “Industry Moves,” 1935; “Industries Speed NRA,” 1935). Echoing sentiments of 410 
dress trade leaders, Emil Rieve, President of the American Federation of Hosiery Workers, 411 
issued a blanket order stating, “We will close down the entire industry if need be in order to 412 
maintain wages, hours, and conditions of work” (“Garment Industry,” 1935, p. 17). Mortimer 413 
Lanzit, Executive Director of the NDMA, even suggested replacing the former NRA insignia 414 
that signified humane production standards with a nationwide “Buy-by-label” campaign, with 415 
garments carrying a “consumer protection label” (“Labor Label Drive,” 1935).  416 
“Insert Figure 2 About Here” 417 
 Despite these enthusiastic endorsements, some industry members were not angry or upset 418 
about the discontinuation of the NRA. Some manufacturers felt that the codes were too stringent 419 
and impossible to enforce (Zelomek, 1935). The high wages and production costs resulting from 420 
the regulations of the NRA meant that few firms experienced profits (Call, 1935b). Many 421 
believed that the NRA supported big business at the expense of small companies, which suffered 422 
under the strict rules of the codes. The elimination of the codes allowed for greater latitude in 423 
wage schedules and hours, and manufacturers and contractors could once again compete on price 424 
(“Darrow Denounces,” 1935). Some retailers even argued that the code restrictions took “all of 425 
the sport out of the industry” because buyers could not “haggle with manufacturers” over 426 
discounts (“Codes a Bulwart, 1935, p. 2).  427 
 Even before the Schechter decision, the large number of amendments and protestations 428 
against the women’s apparel industry codes indicated how unwieldy and ultimately 429 
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unenforceable the codes of conduct were. No longer backed by the power of government, the 430 
apparel industry continued to endure the economic and business practices which gave rise to the 431 
NRA. The apparel industry slipped back to the methods of production which favored lower labor 432 
costs, rather than quality of production (“Garment Industry,” 1935; Richards, 1951).  433 
Conclusions  434 
 While the NRA may be viewed as a failure, the codes ultimately ushered in great changes 435 
in the apparel industry. Legislation succeeding the Blue Eagle supported many of the NRA’s 436 
more tangible ideas. The 1935 National Labor Relations Act declared employees had the right to 437 
organize and bargain collectively, and the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act standardized a 438 
minimum wage (Fitzpatrick, 2009). Further, the NRA contributed to the revival of the union. 439 
According to Dubinsky, in 1932 the ILGWU was an organization of “inactivity, pessimism, and 440 
apathy, bankrupt in every respect, financially, morally, [and] organizationally” (Parmet, 2005, p. 441 
82). During Roosevelt’s presidency and under Dubinsky’s dynamic leadership, the ILGWU more 442 
than quadrupled in membership and gained unprecedented importance and power (Eisner, 1969). 443 
As stated by Dubinsky, “because of the NRA we are not hated any more. The word ‘union’ is not 444 
a curse. The government said that labor has a right to organize” (Parmet, 2005, p. 101).  445 
 Some other ideas supported by the dress manufacturing industry during the NRA, such as 446 
a label to promote humane working conditions, were adapted by the ILGWU label campaign of 447 
1959 to 1975 (Ulrich, 1995). Led by Dubinksy until 1966, the ILGWU used advertisements in 448 
newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, films, and other media to ask retailers and consumers to 449 
purchase union-made American apparel (Ulrich, 1995). The ILGWU also participated in the 450 
1984 creation of the Crafted with Pride in U.S.A. Council, a group that marketed textiles and 451 
apparel made in the United States through television ads, newsletters, and clothing labels and 452 
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hangtags (Burns & Bryant, 2002). Although these later campaigns were focused on promoting 453 
American union-made clothing in an increasingly global environment, the underlying concepts 454 
of encouraging fair labor and business practices were similar to the ideas of the dress 455 
manufacturing codes created under the NRA.  456 
 In the 1990s, organizations such as the American Apparel and Footwear Association and 457 
the American Apparel Manufacturers Association implemented industry-wide, global codes of 458 
conduct (Wolfe & Dickson, 2002). By this time, the American apparel industry faced increased 459 
and intense global competition from overseas imports. Facing diminished membership, the 460 
ILGWU merged with the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union to form the Union 461 
of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE!). In the 2000s, UNITE! launched 462 
Global Justice for Garment Workers and Behind the Label - campaigns that continue the 463 
traditions and ideals of the ILGWU to provide support for the worker (Vance & Paik, 2006).  464 
 Despite these and other attempts to form codes of fair business practices, abuses 465 
including child labor, specifically in developing countries, violation of wage and safety laws, 466 
design piracy, and sweatshop conditions remain unresolved even into the 21st century (Kunz & 467 
Garner, 2007). The history of the NRA codes implemented in the United States women’s ready-468 
to-wear apparel industry provides an important early case study highlighting the difficulties and 469 
complexities of creating and achieving industry-wide standard practices through self-regulation. 470 
The failure of the NRA demonstrates that even with the joint cooperation of industry, labor, and 471 
consumer groups and the backing of the force of law, codes of fair competition proved difficult 472 
to enforce. To broaden our understanding of apparel manufacturing, future researchers may 473 
explore the similarities and differences in the various codes of fair competition created by the 474 
diverse branches of the garment industry.  475 
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